Key Issues in Global Migration
A Human Development Approach

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Introduction

This article sets out to provide an overview of some of the central issues – and especially of the newly emerging issues – in research on international migration and its significance for societies around the world today. It is based on a presentation given at the University of Tokyo at a combined seminar of the Human Security Programme of that University and the Japan Association for Migration Policy Studies (JAMPS), on 2 March 2009. The main source for the ideas and material in this article is the book The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World written jointly by Mark Miller of the University of Delaware and myself (Castles and Miller, 2009).

A brief article like this can, of course, cover only a few of the many important issues connected with migration and diversity. Moreover, it must be remembered that national and local cultures have important effects on the way global trends are experienced. People and governments react in different ways, and their responses are conditioned by diverse historical patterns and cultural values. It is therefore important to look at the local as well as the global, the micro-level and as well as the macro-level. Human action – both of individuals and collectives – always matters, which is why migration research should be interdisciplinary: economists, geographers, political scientists and legal scholars who look at large-scale processes and institutions should work with anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and others who are concerned with communities, social groups and individuals. This article remains mainly at a very general level, and needs to be complemented by the work of scholars working on national and local issues.

The topics to be examined here are the following:
1. The significance of migration for human security and human development
2. Globalization and how it affects international migration
3. The feminization of migration
4. New types of migration or mobility
5. Migration and development
6. Refugees and forced migration
7. Immigrant concentration and social change
8. Diversity and multiculturalism
Since the beginning of the 21st century, governments have increasingly seen migration as a potential threat to security. The New York terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 followed by the Madrid bombings of 2004 and the London bombings of 2005 have led to a widespread belief that Muslim migrants can constitute a danger to democratic societies. This attitude ignores the facts that the overwhelming majority of Muslims oppose fundamentalism and that very few of those involved in these attacks were either migrants or refugees. The idea of immigrants – and particularly those of Muslim background – as a potential ‘enemy within’ is not new (Guild, 2009). Indeed immigrants have for centuries been seen as a threat to state security and national identity. Before Muslims, a succession of other groups was cast in this role by some sections of the media and public opinion (Cohen, 1994). Such attitudes have in turn been used to justify immigration restrictions and reductions in civil liberties – often not just for immigrants but for the population as a whole.

The securitisation of migration and ethnic minorities is based on a perspective that emphasizes the security of rich northern states and their populations, while ignoring the reality that migration and refugee flows are often the result of the fundamental lack of human security in many poorer countries of the South. This absence of human security – which finds its expression in poverty, hunger, violence and lack of human rights – is not in any way a natural condition, but is a result of past practices of colonisation and more recent economic and political power structures, which have created extreme inequality between North and South. Thus the social transformations inherent in globalisation do not just affect economic well-being – they also lead to increased violence and lack of human security. Growing numbers of people have been forced to flee their homes in search of protection and better livelihoods. This is the reality between the observation of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) that international migration is driven by ‘development, demography and democracy’ (GCIM, 2005, 12).

Migration policies too can exacerbate human insecurity. Where states refuse to create legal migration systems, many migrants are forced to move under conditions of great insecurity. Smuggling, trafficking, bonded labour and lack of human and worker rights are the fate of millions of migrants. Even legal migrants may have an insecure residence status and be vulnerable to economic exploitation, discrimination and racist violence. Sometime legal changes can push existing migrants into illegality, as happened to the sans papiers in France in the 1990s. Many governments around the world try to resolve the contradiction between strong labour needs and public hostility to migration by creating differentiated entry systems that encourage legal entry of highly-skilled workers, while excluding lower-skilled workers. Since labour market demand for the latter is strong, millions of migrants are forced to take the risks of irregular migration and employment. Governments often turn a blind eye to this in times of economic
growth, and then tighten up border security and deport irregulars in times of recession.

The USA has officially recorded 12 million irregular migrant (Passel, 2006), while irregular employment has become widespread not only in Southern Europe, but also in the UK and other Northern European states (Berggren et al., 2007; Düvell, 2005; Reyneri, 2001). Asian countries too make systematic use of irregular migrant labour. Malaysia, for instance, was estimated in 2006 (Skeldon, 2006b) to have around 1 million undocumented workers in its total migrant labour force of about 2.6 million. Japan has also used the ‘back door’ of illegal labour migration, along with its ‘side doors’ of recruitment of ‘trainees’ and persons of ethnic Japanese origin from Latin America for factory work.

An important step towards fairer and more effective migration policies is therefore a fundamental change in attitudes. It is important to see migration not as threat to state security, but as a result of the human insecurity that arises through global inequality. Throughout human history, people have migrated in order to improve their livelihoods and to gain greater security. Migration is an important aspect of human development. This approach to migration corresponds with social philosopher and economist Amartya Sen’s principle of ‘development as freedom’ (Sen, 2001). According to this, mobility is a basic freedom, and has the potential to lead to greater human capabilities. Reducing migration restrictions and ensuring that people can move safely and legally helps enhance human rights, and also can lead to greater economic efficiency and social equality. This perspective forms the basis for the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report for 2009, Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development (UNDP, 2009).

This human development approach provides a new frame of reference when thinking about migration and diversity, as well about state policies and public attitudes. It helps to frame my analysis throughout this article.

**Globalization and migration**

International migration is an integral part of globalization. As less-developed countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America are drawn into global economic linkages, powerful processes of social transformation are unleashed. Neo-liberal forms of international economic integration undermine traditional ways of working and living (Stiglitz, 2002). Increased agricultural productivity displaces people from the land. Environmental change compels many people to seek new livelihoods and places to live. People move to the cities, but there are not enough jobs there, and housing and social conditions are often very bad. As outlined above, weak states and impoverishment lead to lack of human security, and often to violence and violations of human rights. All these factors encourage emigration.

At the same time, globalization leads to social transformation in the more economically-developed countries. In the rich countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), industrial restructuring since the late 1970s has meant deskilling and early retirement for many workers. The new services industries need very different types of labour. But, due to declining fertility, relatively few young nationals enter the labour market. Moreover, these young people have good educational opportunities and are not willing to do low-
skilled work. Population ageing leads to increased dependency rates and care needs. Developed countries have high demand for both high- and low-skilled workers, and need migrants – whether legal or not.

Globalization also creates the cultural and technical conditions for mobility. Electronic communications provide knowledge of migration routes and work opportunities. Long-distance travel has become cheaper and more accessible. Once migratory flows are established they generate ‘migration networks’: previous migrants help members of their families or communities with information on work, accommodation and official rules. Facilitating migration has become a major international business, including travel agents, bankers, lawyers and recruiters. The ‘migration industry’ also has an illegal side – smuggling and trafficking – which governments try to restrict. Yet the more governments try to control borders, the greater the flows of undocumented migrants seem to be. Governments remain focused on control national models, while migrants follow the transnational logic of globalized labour markets (Castles, 2004a).

According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the world total of international migrants (defined as people living outside their country of birth for at least a year) grew from about 100 million in 1960 to 191 million in 2005 (UNDESA, 2005). This sounds a lot, but is just 3 per cent of the world’s 6 billion people. It is important to realize that most people remain in their countries of birth. Table 1 presents UN data on trends in international migration since 1960, showing considerable growth in all regions as well as globally. But since 1990, there has been little increase in the number of migrants in Asia, Africa and Latin America – the big growth has been in Europe and North America, reflecting an increase in migration from the Global South (less developed regions) to the North (more developed regions).

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Source: UNDESA 2005.

The importance of South-North migration is revealed even more clearly by Figure 1 (also provided by the UN), which divides international migrants into four geographical categories. The largest number of migrants (62 million) has moved from the less-developed countries of the South to the developed countries of the global North. These migrants are very diverse and include highly-skilled specialists (doctors, IT experts, engineers and managers), as well as low-skilled workers, refugees and family members. The second largest group (61 million) has moved from one southern country to another. The third group (53 million) consists of migrants who
have moved between rich Northern countries. The smallest category is of people who have gone from North to South (14 million).

Figure 1  International migration between South and North, 2005

MIGRANT STOCK IS ALMOST EQUALLY DIVIDED INTO THREE TYPES


However, a focus on international migration can give a deceptive picture. Many people in poorer areas move within their own countries. Internal migration attracts far less political attention, but its volume in population giants like China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria is far greater than that of international movements. The social and cultural consequences can be equally important. In China, the 'floating population' of people moving from the agricultural central and western provinces to the new industrial areas of the east coast numbers at least 100 million, and many of them experience legal disadvantage and economic marginalization very like international migrants elsewhere (Skeldon, 2006a).

The feminization of international migration

A key recent development is increased significance of female migration (IOM, 2005,109-10)). Although women have always played a key role in migration, their numbers have grown in recent years, and increasingly they move independently rather than as spouses of male migrants. Demand for female domestic workers surged from the 1980s in the Middle East, and, from the 1990s, within Asia. The female share among first-time migrant workers from the Philippines rose from 50 per cent in 1992 to 61 per cent in 1998 (Go, 2002: 66), and to 72 per cent by 2006 (ILO, 2007). Although some women migrate to take up professional and executive positions, many migrant women are concentrated in jobs regarded as low-skilled and 'typically female': domestic workers, entertainers and hostesses, restaurant and hotel staff and assembly-
line workers in clothing and electronics. Often, these jobs offer poor pay, conditions and status. Demand for care-givers is likely to be a major factor in the future, due to population ageing in many destination countries – especially Japan. Female migration has considerable effects on family and community dynamics in the place of origin. Married women have to leave their children in the care of others, and long absences affect relationships and gender roles.

A rapidly increasing form of female migration is for marriage. Since the 1990s, foreign brides have been sought by farmers in rural areas of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, due to the exodus of local women to more attractive urban settings. International marriages accounted for almost 14 per cent of all marriages in Korea in 2005, with even higher percentages in rural areas. Marriages are often arranged by agencies (OECD, 2007, 260). This is one of the few forms of permanent immigration permitted in Asia. The young women involved, (from the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand), can experience severe social isolation (IOM, 2000b: 65). China’s one-child policy has led to severe gender imbalances, so that Chinese farmers are beginning to seek brides through agents in Vietnam, Laos and Burma. By 2003, 32 per cent of brides in Taiwan were from the Chinese mainland or other countries, and births to immigrant mothers made up 13 per cent all births (Skeldon, 2006b, 281). This has important cultural implications: the countryside is frequently seen as the cradle of traditional values, and the high proportion of foreign mothers is seen by some as a threat to national identity.

**New types of migration or mobility**

In the past most discussion of international migration has focused either on economically-motivated movements or on flows of refugees and asylum seekers. Recently, migration to escape the effects of climate change has been added to the category of forced migration (Wood, 2001). Moreover, the emphasis has been on long-term or permanent migration and its consequences for both origin and destination societies. However, recent improvements in transport and communications have made it possible for people to move for a wider range of reasons, and often to move temporarily and repeatedly in what is often called ‘circular migration’. Indeed some analysts now prefer to use the term ‘mobility’ to stress the flexible nature of emerging types of movements for purposes such as:

- **Education**: students move internationally, especially for graduate studies, and some of them stay on in the destination country to work for a period or permanently.
- **Marriage**: as described in the previous section, demographic trends such as low fertility, ageing populations and gender imbalances have led to high levels of migration (especially of women) for marriage.
- **Lifestyle**: some people – especially younger people of middle-class background – move in search of new experiences and different lifestyles. Such mobility is mainly temporary, but it can have significant impacts on destination areas.
- **Retirement**: older people, often from affluent backgrounds, move upon ceasing employment in search of better climates, lower living costs and more attractive lifestyles. Examples include British people moving to Spain or Turkey, French people buying property in Morocco, North Americans moving to Latin America or the Caribbean, and Japanese going
to the Philippines, Australia or New Zealand.

**Migration and development**

A key question in current international debates is whether migration encourages development of origin countries or hinders development? A growing literature deals with this theme. In the past, the key issue was whether the gains from remittances would outweigh the potential losses from departure of active workers – especially those with skills: the *brain drain* (Newland, 2003). Now, ideas on the positive effects of migration on development are at the centre of policy initiatives. There has been a plethora of official conferences and reports on the theme (e.g. DFID, 2007; GCIM, 2005; World Bank, 2006). The main emphasis has been on the rapid growth of remittances to less-developed countries (Ghosh, 2006; World Bank, 2006). However, attention has recently begun to shift to the potential role of migrant diasporas in contributing to the development of their homelands (IOM, 2005; Newland, 2007).

As political scientist Devesh Kapur (Kapur, 2004) has pointed out, remittances have become a new ‘development mantra’: the money sent home by migrants is thought to promote local, regional and national development. It is useful to extend this notion of a ‘new mantra’ to include the whole range of benefits that migration is said to bring for development:

- Migrants’ remittances (money transfers back home) can have a major positive impact on the economic development of countries of origin.
- Migrants also transfer home skills and attitudes – known as ‘social remittances’ - which support development.
- Although skilled migration from South to North is growing, ‘brain drain’ is being replaced by ‘brain circulation’, which benefits both sending and receiving countries.
- Migrant diasporas can be a powerful force for development, through transfer of resources and ideas.
- Economic development will reduce out-migration.

Millions of families in origin countries have become dependent on economic remittances. World Bank estimates for 2006 put the total of migrant transfers through official channels to developing countries at $199 billion – a growth of 107 per cent from the 2001 figure of $96 billion (World Bank, 2007). However, unrecorded flows through informal channels may add 50 per cent or more to recorded flows. Remittances are now the largest form of transfer from North to south, exceeding foreign aid, and even foreign direct investment. In 2004, India was the world’s largest recipient of remittances with US$21.7 billion, followed by China (US$21.3 billion), Mexico (US$18.1 billion) and the Philippines (US$11.6 billion) (World Bank, 2006). The global financial crisis of 2007-9 affected many families in origin countries, although remittances proved surprisingly resilient, as migrant workers made sacrifices to help their families at home (Jha et al., 2009; Ratha and Zhimei, 2008).

Detailed studies of origin countries show a diversity of experiences (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008; Delgado Wise and Guarnizo, 2007). Remittances do not automatically lead to beneficial economic and social changes. Indeed, under certain circumstances, remittances can
lead to inefficient types of investment and economic dependence on continuing emigration, and sometimes even hide a reverse flow of funds to rich countries. The claimed positive link between remittances and economic growth only applies if appropriate policies are put in place to encourage legal transfers and productive investment, to reduce corruption and unnecessary bureaucracy, and to provide an investment-friendly infrastructure.

The experience with technology transfer and return of the highly skilled is rather similar: positive effects are only realized if opportunities and structures in emigration countries change in such a way that emigrants do return before the end of their working lives. A further precondition is that skilled migrants are able to enhance or at least maintain their qualifications while away. This is often not the case, since skilled migrants may be employed in low-skilled jobs.

Social remittances can also have varying effects (Levitt, 1998). The message coming back to home communities from emigrants can be that new ways of working, investing and running public affairs can bring prosperity, but it can also be that emigration is the only way out of a hopeless situation. The emergence of emigration as a ‘rite of passage’ for young people can lead to a loss not only of productive workers, but also to the absence of agents of change. Emigration of labour – whether skilled or less skilled – can lead to serious loss of potential growth for the country of emigration. The question is whether this loss can be outweighed in the long run by positive effects.

A key issue in the migration and development debate concerns skilled migration from the South. Governments and international agencies now focus on changing what was previously seen as a damaging ‘brain drain’ into more positive forms of ‘brain circulation’ or ‘brain gain’. However, there is a large gap between official declarations and the reality that rich countries still make great efforts to attract and retain qualified personnel (especially in the fields of medicine, education and information technology) from developing countries. Since the 1970s, the USA, Canada, Britain, Australia and New Zealand have established preferential entry rules to attract medical doctors, engineers, managers and – increasingly – information technology (IT) professionals. In recent years, Germany, France and the European Union have set up their own ‘green card’ or ‘blue card’ systems to draw in mobile professionals. Emerging Asian economies, like Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, have joined the race for human capital, and China is not far behind.

Opinions vary on the consequences of taking the ‘brightest and best’ (Ellerman, 2003, 17) from the South. Stripping the scarce skills of southern nations in a global ‘brain drain’ can harm health and education systems, and hold back development. In 2005 a quarter of all doctors in the USA and a third in the UK were foreign trained (OECD, 2007, 181). Indian doctors and nurses from the Philippines were the largest sources for OECD countries. India, with its huge population can perhaps cope with the departure of medical personnel, but some of the poorest African and Caribbean countries (such as Mozambique, Angola, Haiti, Liberia and Tanzania) have lost more than half their doctors (OECD, 2007, 176-7).

However, some experts argue that ‘brain circulation’ may help improve education systems in origin countries, and will in the long run lead to return of enhanced skills to assist in development (Lowell et al., 2002). Taiwan’s economic take-off relied substantially on bringing back talents, while the growth of the Indian IT industry depended on the return of professionals from Silicon Valley. But the Indian example also reveals the problems of basing development
on return of migrants: the growth of a high-tech sector seems to have brought little benefit for millions of impoverished farmers and urban slum-dwellers, and may have reinforced the dualism of the Indian economy.

Recognition of the role of diasporas in development does seem an important step forward. This new discourse in the international migration field follows changes of perceptions in emigration countries and the introduction of a range of measures and institutions to involve the diaspora in bringing about positive changes in the homeland. Collective remittances for community investment by ‘hometown associations’ and similar groups are still very modest compared with private flows. Knowledge transfer networks (like India's Diaspora Knowledge Network or the Philippine's LINKAPIL) seem positive, but quite small compared with individual remittances and commercial transfers.

My general conclusion on migration and development is therefore that there is great potential for outcomes beneficial to sending country populations, but the conditions for realising these are complex and difficult. Migration alone cannot remove structural constraints to economic growth, social change and greater democracy. There is a need for broadly-based long-term approaches that links the potential benefits of migration with more general strategies to reduce inequality and to improve economic infrastructure, social welfare and political governance. Policies to maximize the benefits of migration for countries of origin should thus be part of much broader strategies designed to reduce poverty and achieve development (DFID, 2007, 37-40).

Refugees and forced migration

Many of the world's migrants are not economically-motivated: they are 'forced migrants' seeking refuge from violence and persecution. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there were about 42 million forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2008. The largest category – over 25 million people – was of internally-displaced persons (IDPs): people forced from their homes, but who remained within their country of origin. Over 15 million were refugees – people who had found refuge in other countries – while 827,000 were asylum seekers – people seeking protection in other countries. About 3.6 million refugees were in the Asia Pacific region. A quarter of the world's refugees were from Afghanistan, while Pakistan was the country with the largest refugee population – some 1.8 million – followed by Syria and Iran. Eighty per cent of refugees were hosted by developing countries (UNHCR, 2009).

The number of forced migrants has increased sharply over the last half century. Far from improving human security and reducing conflict, globalization and modernization seem to have had the opposite effect. Situations of conflict, violence and mass flight developed from the 1950s, in the context of struggles over decolonization and formation of new states. Local conflicts became proxy wars in the East-West conflict, with the superpowers and their satellites providing modern weapons to their supporters. Asia was particularly affected, with major struggles in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Some of these generated large refugee flows, though the more prosperous Asian countries, like Japan, were very unwilling to accept refugees. From the 1980s, conflicts in Southeast Asia
declined in ferocity, but in other regions – notably South Asia, the Middle East and Africa – violence increased sharply, leading to huge displacements.

Northern economic interests – such as the trade in oil, diamonds and weapons – play an important part in starting or prolonging local wars. At a broader level, trade, investment and intellectual property regimes that favour the industrialized countries maintain underdevelopment in the South. Conflict and forced migration are thus ultimately an integral part of the North-South division. This reveals the ambiguity of efforts by the ‘international community’ (which essentially means the powerful Northern states and the intergovernmental agencies) to prevent forced migration. In fact the North does more to cause forced migration than to stop it, through enforcing an international economic and political order that causes underdevelopment and conflict.

Violence and forced migration also bring about further social transformation. Conflict destroys economic resources, undermines traditional ways of life and break up communities. Forced migration is thus a factor that deepens underdevelopment, weakens social bonds, and reduces the capacity of communities and societies to achieve positive change. Post-conflict reconstruction rarely leads to restoration of the pre-conflict situation, but rather to new and often problematic social relationships.

Forced migration has become a key issue in international politics (Loescher, 2001), and efforts for prevention of conflicts and for protection and assistance of forced migrants are far from adequate. As rich countries become less and less willing to admit asylum seekers, many are seeking refuge in new destinations like South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Malaysia and Thailand. Since conflict and impoverishment often go together, it is increasingly difficult to make a clear distinction between economic and forced migration. UNHCR has found it necessary to issue guidelines on how to protect the human rights of people involved in ‘mixed flows’, in which economic and protection motivations are closely linked. (UNHCR, 2006). Refugees and asylum seekers are the most disadvantaged of all in the new global migration hierarchy: in the past they were seen as worthy of international protection; now entry rules have been tightened up to the point where it is virtually impossible to enter most northern countries to make a protection claim. Refugees are forced to become illegal migrants and often end up in long-term illegality.

The great majority of refugees remain in poor countries, which may lack the capacity to protect them and the resources to provide adequate material assistance. Refugees may spend many years living on subsistence rations in isolated camps, with no prospect to return home or to resettle. UNHCR applies the term ‘protracted refugee situation’ to refugee populations of 25 000 persons or more in exile for five or more years. UNHCR estimated that there were 5.7 million refugees in such situations in 22 countries in 2008 (UNHCR, 2009).

Immigrant concentration and social change

According to the United Nations Population Division (UNPD), 63 per cent of the world’s migrants were in developed countries in 2000, where they made up 8.7 per cent of the total population. By contrast, the share in developing countries had fallen to 37 per cent, only 1.3 per cent of total population (UNPD, 2002).
Fairly accurate data are available on immigrant populations in the rich OECD countries, most of which have a large and growing share of foreign-born residents. The ‘classical immigration countries’ have the largest immigrant stocks. The USA had 38 million immigrants in 2005, 13 per cent of the total US population. Canada had nearly 6 million immigrants who made up 19 per cent of the total population. Australia had an immigrant population of 4.8 million in 2005, making up 23 per cent of the total population – the largest share of the major developed countries. If children with at least one immigrant parent are added, about 45 per cent of the Australian population are immigrants or their immediate descendants. But European countries, which until recently aspired to be homogeneous nations, have also changed dramatically since the 1950s. Germany has nearly 11 million foreign-born residents, making up 13 per cent of the population – just as high as the USA. Other Western European countries host millions of immigrants with population shares between 5 and 13 per cent (data from OECD, 2007).

The mono-cultural nation seems to be a figment of an outdated nationalist imagination – in the highly-developed countries at least. However, there are exceptions. Eastern European countries are in a state of economic and political transition, and experience both emigration and immigration, so immigrants are only 2-5 per cent of their populations. In Japan foreign residents only make up 1.6 per cent of the population, while in South Korea, they make up just 1 per cent (but numbers are growing fast).

Many new industrial countries in Asia and the Middle East are now experiencing large-scale immigration: Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan all rely heavily on migrant labour, while in the Gulf oil states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Dubai etc.) foreign workers often outnumber the native populations. The governments of such countries reject the idea of permanent settlement (as European governments did back in the 1970s), and therefore refuse to allow migrants to bring in their families or become citizens. However, many observers believe that settlement processes are beginning, so that these nations too will need to think about long-term social, cultural and political consequences (Castles, 2004b). In Latin America, Argentina and Chile attract many migrant workers, while Mexico – still a major emigration country – is also a transit country for migrants from South and Central America, and increasingly also a destination for immigrants. As for Africa, although Europeans focus on migration northwards across the Mediterranean, over 90 per cent of African migration is actually within the continent, with both highly-skilled and lower-skilled migrants moving to growth areas, for example in Libya, Gabon, Ghana and South Africa (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007).

Migrants and their descendants settle mainly in large cities: they make up 44 per cent of the population of Toronto (Statistics Canada, 2007), 25 per cent in London (ONS, 2002) and 29 per cent in Brussels. Migrants go where the jobs are, and immigration can be used as a barometer of the economic dynamism of cities, regions and countries. Migrants also go where they can join compatriots, who help them to find jobs and accommodation – the ‘network effect’. These mechanisms reinforce each other, and lead to residential clustering, especially in the early period of settlement of each group. This in turn puts pressure on schools, which often have to deal with sudden influxes of children with many different languages.

Concentration affects origin areas too, although accurate statistics are often lacking. In some countries and regions it is has become a normal part of young adulthood to spend a
period working abroad – leading to a ‘culture of emigration’. Currently about 10 per cent of the populations of Mexico, Morocco and the Philippines are living (and usually working) abroad (Castles, 2008). The Philippines has an official policy of being the ‘supplier of workers for the world’ – and the majority of migrants are women who work as domestic helpers, teachers, nurses and ‘entertainers’ in Japan, the Middle East, Europe and North America (Asis, 2005; 2008). Migrants come from specific areas, where working abroad has become part of the local political economy – for India, the state of Kerala is the prime example for labour migration to the Gulf. Often it is middle-income people with property and skills who have the resources to move, so that emigration can both exacerbate skills shortages and inequality.

Many observers see migration as a force for economic growth as well as a way for migrants to improve their livelihoods (UNDP, 2009). Migrant skills have become crucial in rich countries – for example, over 40 per cent of the employed migrant who arrived in Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden and Denmark from 1995 to 2005 had tertiary education, while in France the figure was 35 per cent. Migrants often have higher skill profiles than local-born workers (OECD, 2007, 67-8). Global competition for human capital is hotting up. In older industrial countries the combination of economic growth and demographic decline fuels demand, while new industrial areas like South Korea and even China are increasingly hungry for skills.

**Diversity, integration and multiculturalism**

But migration is not just an economic issue – it changes communities and societies in complex ways. In areas of origin, returnees may import new ideas that unsettle traditional practices and hierarchies. In receiving areas, migration is bringing about unprecedented cultural and religious diversity. Migrants are often seen as symbols of perceived threats to jobs, livelihoods and cultural identities resulting from globalization. Campaigns against immigrants and asylum seekers have become powerful mobilizing tools for the extreme right.

Historically, nation-states have been based on ideas of common origins and culture. Most migrants moved either with the intention of permanent settlement or of a temporary sojourn in one receiving country. Today it is possible to go back and forth, or to move on to other countries. Increasingly, migrants see themselves as members of transnational communities: groups that live their lives across borders (Portes et al., 1999). Many receiving countries have changed their nationality laws to help immigrants and their descendants to become citizens (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2001; Bauböck et al., 2006a; b), for instance by recognizing dual citizenship (Faist, 2007). Rethinking community cohesion and solidarity to include people with diverse cultural and religious practices may be crucial for the future of democracy.

The so-called ‘classical immigration countries’ like the USA, Canada and Australia built their populations and nations through immigration, but were still largely unprepared for the increased cultural diversity resulting from the globalization of migration since the 1960s. The abolition of racist immigration rules together with the increasing ease of travel and communications have led to growth of inflows from all over the world. European immigration countries have found it particularly hard to cope with the unexpected emergence of multicultural societies. Security concerns have also come to the fore since the 9/11 attacks in the USA, with bomb attacks in
several European countries linked to the influence of radical Islamism among a small proportion of immigrant youth.

This helps to explain why there has been a backlash against multiculturalism in many countries. From the 1970s to the early 1990s many countries had moved towards policies designed to recognize the cultural identities and social rights of minorities, and to reinforce the role of the state in combating discrimination and racism. In some cases there were explicit multicultural policies (e.g. Canada, Australia, UK); in others terms such as ‘immigrant policy’ (Sweden) or ‘minorities policy’ (Netherlands) were used; in yet others the notion of ‘integration of foreign fellow citizens’ (Germany) were applied. France was an apparent anomaly, with its Republican Model, which mandated rejection of ethnic monitoring and non-recognition of immigrant cultures and communities. But even here there were surrogate minority policies under the euphemistic label of ‘policy of the city’. The USA too appeared as an exception: the prevailing view was that cultural affairs should not be the concern of the Federal Government, and that integration was best left to the economy and the community. However, in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, Federal and State governments did introduce measures to combat racial discrimination and to guarantee equal opportunities for all, while local authorities supported measures for minority education and participation.

Since the mid-1990s such trends have been reversed. US affirmative action measures have been removed, and there have been campaigns against use of minority languages. In Australia and Canada, multicultural policies still exist, but there is a new emphasis on citizenship and integration. In Europe, the official focus is no longer on the recognition of minority cultures, but on integration, social cohesion and ‘national values’. In Britain, for example, critics of multiculturalism argued that it had failed to provide a unifying national identity. This was (explicitly or implicitly) linked to concerns about the integration and loyalty of Muslims, especially after July 2005. A citizenship test was introduced to promote knowledge of British society and values. Although government statements remained positive about the religious and cultural rights of minorities, a new pressure to confirm with mainstream cultural and behavioural patterns was evident.

Similarly, the French Government reacted to riots by ethnic minority youth in autumn 2005, not by trying to understand the social and economic causes of the unrest, but by introducing a set of tough law and order measures. These measures were seen as discriminatory by most French residents of migrant origin, but were popular with many French voters, and helped Nicholas Sarkozy to become President of France in 2007. The Dutch Government also made sharp changes in policy (Vasta, 2007), while Germany, Sweden and other countries moved in similar directions. However, it is important to note that multiculturalist discourses have often declined more than actual multicultural policies: measures to recognize the social and cultural needs of immigrants and minorities have often changed little, even as public discourse has shifted. The realities of diverse populations and their different lifestyles and social needs make special measures essential, especially at the local level.

The backlash against multiculturalism has been interpreted in differing ways. The dominant approach in the media and politics is to acknowledge the social disadvantage and marginalization of many immigrant groups – especially those of non-European origin – but to claim that ethnic
minorities are themselves to blame by clustering together and refusing to integrate. This is often linked to the idea of the incompatibility of Muslim values with modern European societies. In this interpretation, recognition of cultural diversity has had the perverse effect of encouraging ethnic separatism and the development of ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001). A model of individual integration – based if necessary on compulsory integration contracts and citizenship tests – is thus seen as a way of achieving greater equality for immigrants and their children. The problem for such views, however, is that the one country that has maintained its model of individual integration, France, is also experiencing dramatic problems, which came to a head with the youth riots of 2005 and 2007.

In contrast, proponents of multicultural and equality policies argue that economic, political and social marginalization still experienced by many ethnic minorities in Europe actually reflects the unwillingness of destination societies to deal with two issues. The first is the deep-seated cultures of racism that are a legacy of colonialism and imperialism. In times of stress, such as economic restructuring or international conflict, racism can lead to social exclusion, discrimination and violence against minorities. The second issue is the trend to greater inequality resulting from globalization and economic restructuring. Increased international competition puts pressure on employment, working conditions and welfare systems. At the same time neoliberal economic policies encourage greater pay differences and reduce the capacity of states to redistribute income to reduce poverty and social disadvantage. Taken together, these factors have led to a racialization of ethnic difference. Minorities often have poor employment situations, low incomes and high rates of impoverishment. This in turn leads to concentration in low-income neighbourhoods and growing residential segregation. The existence of separate and marginal communities is then taken as evidence of failure to integrate, and this in turn is perceived as a threat to the host society (Schierup et al., 2006).

Clearly there are important lessons here for the more recent immigration countries of Asia. Failure to address issues of exploitation and marginalization of immigrants early on in the migration and settlement processes can have negative long-term effects on society. If countries with high labour demand and rapidly ageing populations wish to enjoy the economic benefits of migration, they need also to ensure that immigrants gain the social and political rights necessary to make them feel that they are full members of society.

The Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Migration

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that started in 2007 has had important effects on migration, and on the position of migrants in labour markets and societies. It is still too early to fully understand these effects, but it is already becoming clear that the GFC has not led to fundamental changes in global migratory patterns. It is important to distinguish between short- and long-term effects of the crisis on migration and integration. Short-term effects include:

- Return migration of some migrant workers to their homelands as a reaction to unemployment or lower earnings (this has been observed in the case of Polish workers in Britain and Ireland).
- Reduced levels of migration from origin countries to destination countries.
Attempts by governments to provide incentives to unemployed migrant workers to leave. In some cases (e.g. Spain) such policies have been quite unsuccessful, as migrants have preferred to remain in the destination country in the hope of improved future employment opportunities, rather than to return to homelands with far worse economic prospects.

Large declines in irregular migration, which is especially sensitive to availability of jobs (observed in the case of Mexico-US migration).

Reduced remittances (money transfers) from migrants to their home communities, leading to possible hardship in communities dependent on such transfers.

Increased hostility to migrants among majority populations, leading in some cases to conflicts and violence.

However, long-term effects may be rather different and to understand the potential impacts it is useful to look at historical precedents:

The World Economic Crisis of the 1930s led to a massive decline of international labour migration, and to return (sometimes compulsory) of many migrants from countries like the USA and France. However, some of the decline was actually the result of restrictionist policies adopted during and after WWI. For instance in the USA, the 'nativist movement' campaigned against immigration, and major restrictions were introduced in the early 1920s. In any case, many migrants did not return home in the 1930s, but settled and became members of the permanent population of receiving countries.

The recession following the 'Oil Crisis' of 1973, when OPEC states rapidly increased oil prices, had enormous consequences for migration, but hardly anyone predicted them. 'Guestworker migration' ended in Europe, and processes of family reunion and permanent settlement speeded up, leading to the formation of new long-term ethnic minorities. Large corporations developed strategies of capital export, which led to the emergence of new industrial centres – especially in Asia and Latin America – and in the long run to new flows of labour migrants. The recycling of petro-dollars was the basis for an economic boom in oil states. In some cases (such as Dubai and other Gulf states) this led to long-term economic development; in others – like Nigeria – the oil profits were dissipated in corruption and luxury consumption by the elite, with few long-term benefits. The 1973 crisis was a major turning point in global migration.

The effects of the 1997-99 Asian Financial Crisis were more modest. Several governments introduced policies of national labour preference and sought to expel migrants – especially undocumented workers. In some cases, migrants were blamed for unemployment and other social ills – like epidemics and criminality. However, employers (for instance in the Malaysian plantation industry) quickly discovered that many nationals were unwilling to take on 'migrant jobs', even in a recession. Such employers demanded an end to expulsion policies. In any case, the interruption to economic growth in Asia was only short-lived – after 1999 migration grew again and reached new heights.

The lesson from these examples is that the effects of economic downturns on migration are complex and hard to predict. It is mistaken to believe that migrants will serve as a sort of safety valve for developed economies, by providing labour in times of expansion and going away in
times of recession. When economic conditions get bad in rich countries they may be even worse in poorer origin countries. Moreover, migrants are not just economic actors, who follow income maximization motives. They are social beings, who put down roots and form relationships in new countries. At times of recession, the motivation to migrate may be even higher than before, and remittances may prove a resilient form of international transfer, because of migrants’ obligations to their families.

**Future migration trends**

The experience of the GFC makes it clear that relatively short-term economic fluctuations do not alter the fundamental forces that bring about international flows of people in an increasingly inter-linked world. In the short- to medium-term, economic inequality and the demographic imbalances between the ageing populations of the North and the large cohorts of working age persons in the South will remain important factors in generating migration. At the same time, the improvements in transport and communications inherent in globalization make it easier for people to live their lives in expanded social and cultural spaces, which have little to do with the borders of nation-states. Old nationalist ideas of homogeneous national populations, whose political, economic, social and cultural horizons are contained within state borders, seem increasingly unrealistic.

Yet, under the current global migration order, states still have the power to differentiate between those who can be mobile under conditions of safety and dignity (especially the privileged and highly-skilled), and those who are forced to risk injury and exploitation in order to seek better livelihoods elsewhere (mainly lower-skilled workers and asylum seekers). In the long run though, this unequal migration order may not prove sustainable. At present, policymakers in highly-developed countries seem to believe that there is an inexhaustible supply of labour available in less-developed countries. This may be so for the next few decades, but it is unlikely to be so for much longer. The demographic transition to lower mortality and fertility is taking place everywhere. By the middle of this century, many areas in Latin America, South and Southeast Asia and Africa may begin to experience their own labour shortages. They may no longer have reserves of young labour-market entrants, willing to accept high levels of risk and exploitation in order to migrate to today’s highly-developed economies.

The demographic and economic needs for migrants are likely to remain strong in the North, but states may have to work towards a new migration order based not on a one-sided power monopoly, but on cooperation between origin and destination states and all the social groups affected. It will become crucial to reconceptualize migration not as a problem to be solved through strict control, but as a normal part of global change and development, in which decision-makers should aim to minimize potential negative effects and to help realize the potential benefits for the migrants as well as for the economies and the societies involved.

**Migration and international relations: the governance deficit**

Globalization involves the establishment of institutions of global governance, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for finance, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) for trade. Migration, by contrast, has been seen as a preserve of national sovereignty. There is a serious governance deficit: the international community has failed to build institutions to ensure orderly migration, protect the human rights of migrants and maximize development benefits (Bhagwati, 2003).

Elements of an international framework already exist in International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions No. 97 of 1949 and No. 143 of 1975, and in the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. However, relatively few countries have ratified these instruments, and there is little effective cooperation. In fact the most important international measure, the 1990 UN Convention, had only been ratified by 42 nations by July 2009 – out of the 192 members of the UN! Emigration countries have been concerned with reducing internal labour surpluses and maximising remittances. Immigration countries have been reluctant to take steps which might increase labour costs. Efforts are needed to persuade more countries to implement the Conventions and to link them together in a comprehensive framework for the rights of migrant workers.

Some regional bodies seek to cooperate on migration. The European Union has gone furthest by introducing free movement for citizens of member states, and common policies towards asylum and migration from non-members. In future, common policies on migration should be seen as an essential part of regional integration everywhere, and should be linked to policies on international cooperation and development. Bilateral cooperation between states could also bring benefits. Migrants could gain through better protection and social security. Emigration countries could benefit from smoother transfer of remittances and restrictions on agents and recruiters. Immigration countries could gain a more stable and better-trained migrant workforce.

In 2003, A Global Commission on International Migration mandated by the UN Secretary General took up its work. The GCIM Report (GCIM, 2005) argued that migration should ‘become an integral part of national, regional and global strategies for economic growth, in both the developing and the developed world’ The GCIM put forward proposals for maximizing the benefits of international migration, including measures to limit the ‘brain drain’, to prevent smuggling and trafficking, to encourage the flow of remittances and to enhance the role of diasporas as agents of development. Migration and development was the topic of a High Level Dialogue of ministers and senior officials at the UN General Assembly in September 2006. This led to the establishment of a Global Forum on Migration and Development, which met in Brussels in 2007, in Manila in 2008 and Athens in 2009, and will meet again in Mexico in 2010.

Such bodies have no decision-making powers: they have a merely advisory role, and powerful states have been unwilling to implement any measures that might lead to higher costs for migrant labour. But the difficulties experienced by developed states in managing migration may in future lead to more willingness to cooperate with origin states. Perhaps this might bring about greater North-South dialogue and cooperation on migration issues. However, this will only happen if all concerned are willing move away from old prejudices, and look for new ways forward that will be of benefit to migrants, sending countries and receiving countries alike.

It is mistaken to see migration in isolation from wider issues of global power, wealth and
inequality. Mobility of people is an integral part of the major changes currently affecting all regions of the world. Increasing economic and political integration involves cross-border flows of capital, commodities, ideas and people. In recent years it has been the growing environmental challenges that have made us realize that we live in one world, and that national approaches on their own are inadequate. The same principle applies to migration: global cooperation is essential, and this requires approaches that abandon short-term national interests in favour of long-term cooperation between rich and poor nations. Fairer forms of migration should be an integral part of comprehensive development strategies designed to reduce global inequality.

Consequences for Japan

Many of the global trends described in previous sections have important lessons for Japan. No country which wishes to participate in the global economy and to have a high standard of living can isolate itself from social and cultural developments in the rest of world. Japan too is an immigration country – but an unwilling one, where traditional ideas on autonomy and cultural homogeneity have acted as barriers to rational debate and public policy. Japan urgently needs migrant workers. However, concerns about ethnic homogeneity and national identity have proved important obstacles to planned immigration policies. The Japanese government has sought to resolve the contradiction through the ‘side doors’ of trainee recruitment and admission of persons of Japanese origins (Nikkeijin), or the ‘back door’ of irregular employment. Yet it is impossible for a democratic polity with a strong civil society to prevent some settlement of immigrants and to ignore their social and cultural needs once present. Pressures for change are building up.

Today migrants make up only about 1.6 per cent of Japan’s population of 126 million – a far lower share than in North America, Western Europe or Australia (OECD, 2007). However, low birth rates and population ageing make it likely that immigration will grow in future. Well-educated young Japanese are unwilling to take factory jobs. Government policy encourages investment in new technology to raise labour productivity, while many companies shift labour-intensive workplaces to low-wage countries. But there are limits to these approaches: it is hard to relocate construction and services jobs, and many factory jobs, such as making car components, are part of complex supply chains which cannot easily be divided geographically. A topical issue is the lack of care workers to look after Japan’s growing elderly population. Marriage migration is also increasing, especially of foreign brides for Japanese farmers.

Research shows that immigrant workers are heavily concentrated in certain sectors or occupations, causing structural dependence (Mori, 1997, 155). Employers need stable, trained workforces, and are keen to retain good workers; this is a powerful force for longer stay. Differing employment patterns are linked to varying legal status: regular workers (especially Nikkeijin) find jobs in large enterprises, while irregular workers are mainly in small enterprises or informal-sector jobs. A study of Asian newcomers in the Shinjuku and Ikebukuro districts of Tokyo found some long-term settlement, as well as intermarriage with Japanese (Okuda, 2000). A study of Nikkeijin in Toyota City found high levels of concentration in certain apartment blocks, and frequent isolation from the Japanese population (Tzusuki, 2000). Komai (Komai, 1998; 2000)
found tendencies to international marriages, family formation, residential concentration and the building of ethnic communities. Ethnic places of worship, businesses, associations and media were beginning to emerge.

Another significant trend is the gradually improving - though still weak - situation of immigrants with regard to civil, political and social rights (Kondo, 2001). Long-standing residents, mainly of Korean origin, may remain non-citizens even into the third or fourth generation due to restrictive naturalization laws. However, legal changes in 1992 led to a gradual rise in naturalizations. In 2005, 15,251 foreigners acquired Japanese citizenship – just 0.8 percent of the foreign population (OECD, 2007, 259). But public authorities are gradually including foreign residents – even irregular workers – in health, education and welfare services. Social integration programmes have been introduced, including employment service centres for foreign workers and education for children of foreign nationals on equal terms with native Japanese. Many voluntary associations have been set up to work for improved rights for immigrants.

Settlement is clearly taking place, and is likely to increase in the years ahead. Japan seems certain to become a more diverse society, and this has important consequences. So far, the central government has on the whole ignored such trends, and done little to change policies on immigration and the rights of migrant workers and their families. Yet democratic societies have an inherent tendency to include all permanent residents in economic, social and political processes. Societies in which certain groups are excluded from rights are divided and conflictual, and waste the abilities of many of their members. Successful societies in the 21st century are likely to be open and inclusive.

This principle has already been understood by many city governments: where there are large concentrations of migrants, local authorities find it essential to introduce measures to provide welfare and education for them. This means recognizing the different values, customs and religions that the newcomers bring with them. In some older immigration countries, it has taken many years for governments to recognize the duty of the state to combat discrimination and to develop policies for equal rights at the workplace, secure residence rights for migrants and their families, freedom of cultural expression within a single legal system, and full access to government services for all. In the long run such steps are essential – whether they are labelled as ‘integration,’ ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘social cohesion.’ Japan urgently needs a debate on these topics. Early action to recognize diversity and to improve the rights of migrants and minorities could avoid many problems in the future.

*1 There are too many important works on this topic to list here. Many references are given in: (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008; Castles and Miller, 2009; de Haas, 2006; Massey et al., 1998; UNDP, 2009). See also the Migration Information Source website: http://www.migrationinformation.org/index.cfm

*2 About 7 million of Germany's foreign-born population are of non-German origin (the largest group being Turkish immigrants and their descendants), while about 4 million are 'ethnic Germans', most of whom came from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after 1990.

*3 This section is based on a 'virtual symposium' on the effects of the Global Financial Crisis on migration on The Age of Migration Website. For more detailed analyses and links see: http://www.age-of-migration.com/
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