Managing Diversity
The Issues of Immigrant Settlement and Social Cohesion

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Introduction

This article is concerned with the issues associated with the settlement of immigrants and the way in which countries and states seek to manage the resulting diversity and community relations. We have chosen to focus on the political and policy goal of social cohesion as a way of exploring these issues, although some countries chose to use the term while others do not. It is based on a recent book project of ours (Diverse Nations, Diverse Responses: Approaches to Social Cohesion in Immigrant Societies, McGill Queens University Press – see Spoonley and Tolley, forthcoming) that saw contributors analyze the situation and approaches in long-standing settler societies (Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand), those societies that were in transition from emigrant to much more immigrant dominated societies (Germany, France) along with a group to a group of Asian societies (Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong). It extends a previous contribution to Migration Policy Review by Stephen Castles (2010) and his discussion of diversity, integration and multiculturalism.

The presence of immigrants and the importance of immigration has continued to define the domestic politics and policies of many countries around the world. Our focus here is on receiving countries in the developed world and their experiences since the turn of the century as they manage immigrant-related diversity, the settlement of immigrant communities and anti-immigrant politics that have increased in significance in recent years. Social cohesion is an important focus as it has been used (in very different ways) in many of the countries listed above – and others – as expressing a high level policy goal in relation to successful immigrant settlement, their acceptance by various host communities and positive personal and community relations. It is a concept that has certain problems as we shall see shortly but it provides a focal point in discussing what constitutes successful settlement and integration.
The topics to be examined here include:
1. The management of migration
2. Diversity management
3. Social cohesion
4. Social cohesion as a policy goal in various settings
5. Challenges to social cohesion in the 21st century
6. Social cohesion – some suggestions and conclusions

1 The management of migration

The systems for managing migration in developed countries have evolved considerably since the post-war period. Miles (1989) characterizes the political economy of labour of this period as requiring new sources of labour to compensate for the shortages created by the war and to supply labour for the expanding industrial sectors, especially (but not only) in Europe. An important source proved to be the former colonies of these metropolitan centres and states instituted a contract migrant worker system that lasted from the late 1940s to the early 1970s (Miles, 1989: 117). But many of these migrants were culturally and phenotypically different and Miles points to the increasing problematization of these migrants, their racialization and new sets of ideological relations and struggles (Miles, 1989: 118-119). The result was that states, in addition to recruiting migrant labour, now also had to invest considerable resources in managing the resulting inter-group/communal tensions and hostility. This was particularly true of many countries in Europe and was less obvious in the traditional settler countries, notably the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, which had always recruited immigrants as part of the project of establishing a nation (see Kondo, 2001, for examples). However, even here there were new tensions as culturally and visibly different migrants arrived; in the case of New Zealand, these involved Polynesians from the Pacific (see Spoonley and Bedford, forthcoming).

The 1970s and 1980s were to be transition decades as new immigrant management regimes began to emerge. In the case of the settler societies, Canada and Australia developed official policies of multiculturalism in the 1970s in recognition of diversity. Then, by the 1980s, they had developed a targeted immigrant recruitment system which relied on the allocation of points for certain characteristics as a way of approving immigrants for residency. New Zealand adopted the same system after radically changing its immigration policies in 1986/87 leading to a CANZ (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) approach to skilled immigrant recruitment. The effect in all three countries was that about 60 percent of permanent immigrants were recruited for the skills, experience or capital that they could provide, hence they were known as...
“economic immigrants”, while another 30 percent came as part of family reunification and 10 percent were humanitarian immigrants, either refugees or asylum seekers. The other settler society, the USA, had adopted some of these features but not others, so that recently, 65 percent of those approved for permanent residency came under family connections or reunification.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, a different system also emerged in Europe with the expansion of the European Union and the agreement that citizens of EU countries had the right to work and reside in other EU countries. The fact that 27 EU states would waive the right to control borders in this way and permit labour mobility and residence was a significant departure from the past. There have been challenges to these agreements recently – the Sarkozy government’s move to deport Roma in 2010 is one example. But what these initiatives did was reflect the emerging reality of late twentieth century states and economies, notably the challenges presented by the demographic aging of populations, the shortage of labour supply and especially the shortage of skilled labour in areas of expansion, and the nature of an increasingly globalised world with enhanced levels of mobility and transnationalism.

By the first decade of the twenty-first century, immigration was an important element in the population and economic policies of many countries, from those such as the Philippines that actively managed a significant labour diaspora and relied heavily on remittance flows to those that now relied on temporary labour schemes (such as countries in the Middle East) through to those countries where immigrants made up at least a quarter of the resident population (Canada, Australia and New Zealand for example). Some countries in Europe, such as Britain or Germany, which had been primarily countries of emigration now had much more significant arrival numbers. Major talent pools of labour and skills such as Eastern Europe, China and India provided major new flows of immigrants while other countries such as Japan were beginning to expand migrant labour options. If immigrant recruitment was one component, and an increasingly important one to compensate for labour and population shortages, then the equally important issue has been the question of settlement and diversity management.

2 Diversity management

The question of immigrant integration has a long history in policy and research literatures. For a long period, the outcome of immigrant settlement was as an expectation of assimilation to whatever was deemed the normative or majority culture. Migration was a linear process that meant permanent settlement and the transferral of loyalty to the new nation and state. But this typically existed alongside forms of
exclusion; some nationalities or immigrants were racialised and policy was developed to exclude their presence or to discriminate against them in various ways in a nation-state. In the case of those settler societies that relied on immigrants as a means of colonization and nation-development, their expectations were broadly assimilationary although all sought to exclude Asians as immigrants or sojourners in various ways through much of a colonial history. But as immigration recruitment systems changed, so did expectations about immigrant settlement in the late twentieth century.

The size and nature of immigration by the last decades of the twentieth century meant that diversity management was an increasingly important component of what states did. This had two distinct components. The first was access to the formal status of citizenship and the rights that this entailed. A spectrum emerged. Some countries, such as Switzerland, continued to exercise very high thresholds for immigrants to gain access to citizenship but others were much less exercised by such matters; for instance, in New Zealand, being approved as a permanent residence carries all the rights of citizenship so that there are few advantages to gaining the latter. The establishment and the rules of engagement of the EU, along with other regional agreements, do suspend some of the nation-specific expectations concerning citizenship so that elements –residency, the right to work - are shared by any citizen of a member country. But if formal membership of a national community was one element, the other was the issue of what occurred at the community level. Here, there were further shifts. While there were still expectations about immigrant adjustment to a destination country, there was a growing recognition that host communities also needed to adjust and the emphasis was on a “two-way process with a plurality of local outcomes” (Penninx, 2009: 5). In a number of countries, social cohesion emerged as a policy goal that encompassed the ambitions of both successful immigrant settlement and positive community relations between immigrant and host communities by the 1990s.

3 Social cohesion

The concept of social cohesion has a history that derives from the writings of the sociologist Emile Durkheim in the late 19th and early 20th century, and it generated some interest in the 1940s and again in the 1970s (Hulse and Stone, 2007; Jenson, 1998). But it gained in importance in the 1990s when the Council for Europe, the OECD, the Club of Rome and the Government of Canada all produced a series of reports on social cohesion.

There a number of problems with the term: it is used alongside and sometimes interchangeably with social capital, community cohesion and social inclusion; it might
refer to public policy ambitions or as an “analytical construct to explain social, political and sometimes economic changes” (Hulse and Stone, 2007: 109); it is defined and used quite differently in different settings and countries and it has a certain vagueness as a “quasi-concept” (Bernard, 1999: 3). The result is that social cohesion is sometimes equated with equality and/or social solidarity while in other cases, social networks and social capital are emphasized (Jenson, 2010; Beauvais and Jenson, 2002). In the European context, social cohesion is linked with social inclusion/exclusion as well as with economic and social well-being (Jeannotte, 2000). In some cases, it is an end-state while in others, it is a process (Hulse and Stone, 2007; Spoonley et al, 2005).

And there are no shortage of academic and research critics (Spoonley and Tolley, forthcoming). But despite all the vagueness, variable usages and criticisms, it has been widely used to frame debates about immigrant-host relations and outcomes. Perhaps, its value comes from the fact that it is used to encourage debates about political values and goals and as a “contribution to framing conversations, to helping make sense of complex relationships, and to setting goals” (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002: 31).

While there is no commonly accepted definition of social cohesion in the international literature, the Canadian social theorist Jane Jenson has usefully described a ‘socially cohesive society’ as one where all groups have a sense of ‘belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy’ (Jenson, 1998). These positive attributes are often accompanied by reference to the presence and outcomes associated with negative characteristics such as isolation, exclusion, non-involvement, rejection and illegitimacy as reflecting the absence of cohesion. Social cohesion is often linked to social capital with one contributing to the development of the other. Beauvais and Jenson (2002) have indicated some of the elements which link the two and which underline the importance of social cohesion in managing diversity and immigrant settlement. These are:

- common values and a civic culture
- social order and social control
- social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities
- social networks and social capital
- territorial belonging and identity.

Beauvais and Jenson (2002) point out that each of these elements can be linked or they could be free-standing. There are ‘definitional choices [which] have significant consequences for what is analysed, what is measured, and what policy action is recommended’ (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002: 6). Further definitional elements and commentaries are provided by others (Policy Research Initiative, n.d.; Spoonley et al., 2005; Jenson, 1998; 2010). For the moment, the five elements that Jenson identifies above, along with the relationship to social capital and to broader social and economic
considerations, provides a working definition for the purposes of this review. However, social cohesion is used in different ways in different contexts.

4 Social cohesion as a policy goal in various settings

Social cohesion, as a policy goal or way of framing discussions about immigrant-host outcomes has been most widely used in the EU (see Farrell and Thirion, forthcoming) along with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The EU, Council of Europe and the OECD have invested a considerable amount of resource in social cohesion as a social and economic goal. The Council of Europe first added a recommendation concerning social exclusion and social cohesion in 1998. The approach has evolved since but the Council of Europe's social cohesion focus has been on primarily concerned with reducing inequality and polarization at the same time as being an element in the promotion of societal well-being (Farrell and Thirion, forthcoming). Jeannotte (2000: 2) identifies four key concerns associated with social cohesion in the European context, including:

- the lack of a sense of European citizenship, political disenchantment and a rights deficit;
- unemployment, poverty and income inequality, rural deprivation/regional disparities and urban distress;
- deterioration of the environment and the quality of life, social exclusion from the Information Society;
- cultural diversity and demographic change, changing values regarding work and society, the influence of American culture and the shift from a 'culture of collective security' to a 'culture of individual opportunity'.

As this list indicates, cultural diversity and the issues associated with immigrant settlement constitute only one component of broader social cohesion issues, and this is confirmed by the Council of Europe’s (2000) list of the defining characteristics of social cohesion:

- shared loyalties and solidarity;
- strength of social relations and shared values;
- feelings of common identity and sense of belonging to the same community;
- trust among members;
- reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion.

This has been underpinned by a very extensive programme to measure social cohesion although there is a lack of agreement concerning what social cohesion means in the European context amongst member states.

The over-arching focus gets played out in quite different ways in the member
countries of the European Union. For example, the issue of social cohesion was significantly defined by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain in 2000 (see Parekh, 2000), the Cantle (2001) report after riots in northern cities significantly increased the concern with cohesion and then again after the London bombings in 2005. In June 2006, a new Social Exclusion Taskforce was established in the Cabinet Office to join the Home Office’s Community Cohesion Unit and the Cohesion Advisory Panel, and these developments, amongst others, reflected the joint concerns of exclusion (and parallel communities) and inclusion, with social inclusion being regarded as an important and desirable element of active citizenship (see Davies, 2005). The UK approach is best reflected in the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007) publication Our Shared Future although the current Conservative Government led by Cameron has retreated from elements of this approach, not the least because of their rejection of multiculturalism as a key policy in managing diversity. This has been repeated elsewhere in Europe (see comments below) as countries such as France and Germany have moved to articulate more explicit expectations about immigrant conformity and assimilation with less of an emphasis on host society and institutional adjustments to accommodate diversity despite the fact such countries are now major destinations for immigrants and refugees whereas emigration was a more common story for much of their recent history. Germany as a state and Germans are still struggling to come to terms with the fact that they are an immigrant country. Triadafilopoulos, Kortewag and Del Moral (forthcoming) note that “integration” is the more commonly used concept although it tends to hide exclusionary and restrictive policies. France has a very particular approach to both citizenship and immigrant settlement, influenced by Jacobinist and republican notions of citizenship. The experience has been marred by significant conflict, including riots, negative media representations of immigrants and immigration, a vocabulary which deploys dismissive and demeaning labels, and the approach of a government which is keen to regulate immigrant and minority ethnic/religious community behavior. Social cohesion as policy goal and discourse at the European level is undermined by the political inclinations of some countries and their political leadership while it is altered by others to accord with local issues and political concerns.

Canada has invested a considerable amount of policy and political time into developing the concept, with some key contributors to the literature coming from the local policy community (see Jenson, 2010; Jeanotte, 2000) along with the activities of the Social Cohesion Network as part of the Policy Research Initiative in 2001/2002. By 2002, the discourse had evolved from a focus on cohesion to one that also included inclusion. In order to build a cohesive society, the barriers to inclusion must be addressed and five areas of exclusion were identified as needing attention: access
to goods and services, employment, education, housing and social network and civic participation (Kunz, 2003). Although social cohesion is less likely to be used currently in the country, it has been a part of Canada’s approach to managing diversity for some two decades and it reflects concerns about religious pluralism, the so-called “clash of cultures”, lower levels of trust and participation between and amongst some minority ethnic and immigrant communities and post-9/11 security concerns. The Canadian approach has been an influential one. Both Australia (see Neerup, forthcoming) and New Zealand (see Spoonley and Peace, forthcoming) have explored and used the concept of social cohesion as part of a public policy discourse and as a way discussing inclusion/exclusion and community relations. But for other countries, social cohesion does not register as a policy concern or other concepts are used.

One notable candidate is the USA. Social cohesion is not used in policy or political circles, or only rarely. Discourse is most likely to be framed in relation to American “virtues” such as equality, freedom and the pursuit of happiness (see Bloemraad and de Graauw, forthcoming). As Bloemraad and de Graauw go on to explain, the policy landscape is complex with several layers of government, significant regional variation and multiple players providing a series of divergent approaches with little to provide the over-arching policy platform for a concept such as social cohesion at a regional level much less in relation to a national context. Instead, some elements of civil rights legislation and policy does apply to immigrants but not always neatly while the policy and political emphasis is on those elements which contribute to “good citizens” and a singular loyalty to the American nation. Recently, this has been underlined by those espousing an exclusive and narrow nationalism (see below) in a very conflicted/divided political terrain. But the USA is hardly the only country to express little interest in social cohesion per se.

There is little history in Asian countries of interest in a concept such as social cohesion, with the possible exception of Hong Kong where social cohesion is used in the context of debates about social exclusion and poverty (see Chan and Chan, forthcoming). Singapore and Japan are both defined by very strong nationalistic traditions, although Singapore’s state-engineered approach to economic development and cosmopolitanism does embrace the “4Ms” – multiracialism, multilingualism, multireligiosity and multiculturalism (see Yeoh and Cheng, forthcoming). Japan has a long-standing and still important myth about the homogeneity of the nation (Oishi, forthcoming; Kondo, 2001) although the cultural demography of the country is changing, as others are, in response to labour supply shortages and demographic aging. Social cohesion is not part of the vocabulary of Japanese policy discussions and the alternative, “multicultural coexistence” has drawn opposition and criticism. China, faced with a major internal migration and economic growth (which will require more
skilled workers as this growth continues), tends to emphasize “social harmony”.

The overall result is that social cohesion has played an important role in the policy debates and discourses concerning immigrant settlement and immigrant-host communities acceptance and tolerance in some countries but it has played little or no role elsewhere. But this is very much a function of the contextual and historical differences between countries in relation to immigration. All face similar problems of how to manage diversity within the boundaries of the state and the effects of globalization and transnationalism across those boundaries. Some of these challenges have grown in importance in the first decade of the 21st century.

5 Challenges to social cohesion in the 21st century

(1) Anti-immigrant politics

The events of the first decade of the 21st century have contributed to a resurgence in anti-immigrant politics. The occurrence of 9/11 in the USA, the London bombings of July 2005 combined with the presence of culturally and religious “others” to produce concerns about national security and identity. The responses have included those of Arizona or Florida with the emphasis on racial profiling and the policing of those who might be suspected of being in the USA illegally, the anti-immigrant politics of Geert Wilder (Freedom Party) in the Netherlands or the massacre perpetrated by the extreme nationalist, Anders Breivik, in Norway through to the moves by the Sarkozy government in France to ban the burqa, religious displays or to repatriate Roma. By the end of the decade, explicit and often extreme anti-immigrant parties and representatives were to be found in parliaments in Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Austria while hostility towards and violence against immigrants and ethnic minorities were advocated by a range of groups, such as the English Defence League in the UK, the Nordic League (Nordiska Forbundet) in Scandinavia or the Swiss People’s Party. The latter have been helped considerably by the one-to-many communication abilities of the internet (Townsend and Traynor, 2011). And the USA played an important role in these politics.

After the occurrence of 9/11, the distrust of Muslim communities increased and conservative political commentators such as Bill O'Reilly commented that all Muslims were, by definition, terrorists. Such comments became part of a public discourse which demonized and racialized a relatively small American community. Nativists and exclusive nationalist views gained in importance and have been represented on Fox News and amongst elements of the Tea Party. By the time of the mid-term elections in 2010, these discourses had become routine in public debate and commentary and the Tea Party had made major gains, both in representatives in the American Senate
and in terms of influence inside the Republican Party. The Islamaphobia that occurred in the wake of 9/11 was accompanied by white anxieties (Rodriguez, 2010) about the demographic displacement of whites by Latinos in many parts of the country and by a sense that American influence and values (defined in nationalistic and patriotic terms) were less apparent, both domestically and internationally. As Rodriguez (2010: 42) notes, anti-immigrant sentiments and politics have led to a ‘defensive, aggrieved sense of white victimhood that strains the social contract and undermines collectively shared notions of the common good’. In post-9/11 America, there is significantly increased border and domestic security measures, extensive monitoring of those groups deemed to be a threat and explicit requirements concerning other countries and airlines to provide much more extensive security measures, particularly of those flying to the USA. Many of these measures are understandable given the violence of 9/11 but they are accompanied by less justifiable and crude anti-immigrant politics. These politics are hardly confined to the USA – there is the example of a Bundesbank board member who claimed in a book in 2010 that Muslim immigrants are ‘dumbing’ down Germany, that they were particularly associated with welfare dependency and criminality, and that there ‘congenital disabilities’ amongst Kurdish and Turkish migrants (Connolly, 2010) provides a German parallel while Marine Le Pen, a member of the European Parliament, articulates a softer version of her father’s extreme nationalism amongst a resurgent French anti-immigrant constituency (Chrisafis, 2011). The role of the media and political forms of representation contribute to the presence of anti-immigrant politics.

Both politics and the media have become more fragmented. In the case of the media, privatized media players such as Fox have expressed partisan and often extremely nationalistic views of the world from an American base. They have also been influential in defining public debate and discourses, and in supporting certain parties and politicians, most obviously in the United States. This fragmentation parallels what is happening in terms of political representation. The diversity of political constituencies has meant the decline of mass membership political parties in many countries and the rise of single issue campaigns and sometimes the election of more extreme political representatives. Traditional centre-left and centre-right political parties struggle to know how to appeal to both long-standing constituencies, especially working and middle class (many of whom are exercised by both economic pressures and the ‘white anxieties’ that Rodriguez refers to) and, at the same time, to significant minority ethnic and immigrant communities who are now much more politically influential. This landscape is complicated by the politics of religion and religious communities who might, or might not, overlap with the ethnic schisms of societies. For parties who are seeking to gain majorities, balancing these complex nationalistic
and ethnic politics in order to appeal simultaneously to diverse communities is a major challenge. It is little wonder that anti-immigrant parties find space for their views in both the media and in political representation. Even those that would traditionally represent diversity as centre-left parties have articulated a version of diversity or immigration-containment (for example, see the appeals to freeze the arrival of immigrants and to call for the renewal of ‘our common life, our common law’ by an influential member of the British Labour Party recently; Moss, 2011). Anti-immigrant politics and discourses remain a powerful challenge to the issues of social cohesion.

(2) Dismissal of multiculturalism

Canada and Australia forged a modern and official policy of multiculturalism as one aspect in recognizing and managing immigrant-related diversity. In both countries, the nature of this multiculturalism has evolved (see Jupp, 2011, for an analysis of changes to Australian multiculturalism). In the case of Australia, the conservative government of John Howard reduced the investment in multiculturalism and it became less central to diversity recognition much less management. Moreover, what the Australians refer to as ‘dog whistle’ politics involving significant anti-immigrant views (especially towards asylum seekers or so-called ‘boat people’) emerged, with the then government prominently involved. The most celebrated case occurred just prior to the 2001 general election when the minister concerned claimed falsely that asylum seekers were throwing children overboard from their boats. Elements of this have continued and in the 2010 general election, the leaders of both major political parties (both of whom were immigrants themselves) expressed anti-immigrant views, especially concerning the need for immigrants to adopt ‘Australian ways’. Elsewhere, multiculturalism has been dismissed as undermining a liberal democracy (Kaufmann, 2010) and Fukuyama (2007) has argued that the ‘old multicultural model…out of respect for cultural differences – and in some cases out of imperial guilt…ceded too much authority to cultural communities to define the rules of behavior for their own members’. He is most exercised by the arrival of Muslims in the West and argues that they ‘demand’ group rights which ‘cannot be squared with the liberal principles of individual equality’ (Fukuyama, 2007). And Angela Merkel has declared that multiculturalism is dead (Bloemraad, 2010), a view shared by conservative politicians in the UK (see comments about the ‘one-nation conservatism’ of the Cameron government; Moss, 2011).

The counter to these arguments is provided by a group of writers who include Rainer Baubock, Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting. In response to arguments that an official multiculturalism undermines ‘national solidarity and trust’, Baubock (1999) points out that, if anything, the reverse is true; that a modern liberal state requires an acknowledgement of diversity for it to retain the trust of its various communities. And
Kymlicka and Banting (2006:301) are writers who view multiculturalism as part of how a modern state should operate, with clear benefits:

In short MCPs [multicultural policies] are likely to sustain, rather than erode, national solidarity when (a) they contain a destigmatising dimension, (b) they are supplemented with nation-building policies, and (c) they are integrated into a national narrative that is the source of collective pride...however, this...package is a very ‘nation-centered’ one. It extends rights and recognition to immigrants, and hence reflects a distinctly multicultural form of nationalism, one in which national identity has been modified (and ‘thinned’) to be more inclusive of ethnic heterogeneity.

The failure to recognize the difference of minority ethnic and immigrant communities undermines the promotion of equal citizenship and reinforces the state’s practices that embody the cultural values of hegemonic groups (Baubock, 1999). Baubock (1999) does make an important distinction between the rights of national minorities or colonized indigenous peoples and those of minority ethnic groups that migrate to a country, both of whom deserve to be recognized by the state but in different ways and for different reasons. This is an important distinction for settler countries such as New Zealand, Australia and Canada where the debates about the recognition and rights of indigenous communities and those attached to cultural diversity are important but complex. Multiculturalism can, at one level, be a recognition of demographic diversity but it also can operate as a political philosophy and as public policy (Bloemraad, 2010), all of which can mean very different things.

Multiculturalism as an official policy of the state has come under attack recently, even in countries where multiculturalism has never been an official policy (see Bloemraad’s, 2010, critique of Merkel). But there are also powerful sociological and policy arguments in response, that argue that group-differentiated rights and the state-sponsored recognition of diversity legitimize governance structures and policies and promote equality. There remain important questions of political leadership and brokerage:

…how do policy makers foster social cohesion and national unity in a context of increasing cultural pluralism and conflicting values?...what are the limits to tolerance? What kinds of diversity are simply unacceptable, and thus not to be tolerate, in a free and democratic society? (Boston and Callister, 2005: 35).

(3) Community conflict

The early waves of post-war migration were punctuated by significant clashes and violence. In the UK, names like Toxteth, St Pauls or Brixton became emblematic of clashes between different and ethnic communities, or between disaffected minority ethnic and immigrant communities and the state. But these conflicts were not
confined to the 1970s or 1980s. At the turn of the century, riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford reignited concern, giving rise to the early British work on social or community cohesion (see Cantle, 2001). And then in August 2011, further riots took place in British cities after police shot a man. The reasons were given as a mix of tense ethnic relations, youth alienation and high unemployment (Thomas and Somaiya, 2011). And they were hardly unique to Britain as the periodic riots in the banlieues of France to the inter-racial conflict of Cronulla in Australia (Collins, 2007) to Vancouver in 2011.

These examples of community conflict are underpinned by routinized violence that is part of policing and other forms of state control in troubled neighbourhoods in many destination cities on a regular basis. But it is the prominence and damage caused by riots that attract attention and which often contribute to anti-immigrant politics or punitive policy responses. These conflicts are now represent the cycle of violence and marginalization that social cohesion policies are designed to address.

6. Social cohesion – some suggestions and conclusions

Social cohesion provides one conceptual and policy approach to immigrant integration but as some of the comments above will have made clear, we (and others) feel that there are limitations to the concept. Firstly, the experiences, approaches and circumstances of those countries that face immigration in significant numbers and who must manage diversity differ widely and it is not surprising that both the conceptual or policy lens varies as much as it does. Moreover, to return to the point made by Beauvais and Jenson (222:31), social cohesion operates as a ‘quasi-concept’ that helps frame ‘conversations’, including those that seek to review current approaches. Other concepts, such as integration, perform as a similar function although in this case, it rather begs the question of ‘integrating to what’?

Secondly, the political climate in a number of countries has seen the rise in anti-immigrant politics on one hand and the rejection of multiculturalism on the other. Community conflict does not help, nor has the impacts of the global financial crises which has made economic-related community tensions that much more obvious. Rodriguez (2010) highlights the anxiety of whites in the USA but similar anxieties are apparent elsewhere as communities feel threatened by demographic and cultural changes, spurred on by anti-immigrant politicians or nationalistic media commentators and channels. Social cohesion, as a policy approach, appears to have had its hey-day in the late 1990s and early 2000s in some countries, but it has either been supplemented by other policy approaches (Canada, New Zealand, Australia), has been undermined by the conservative and nationalistic politics (UK) or was never really an important
option (France, Germany). Elsewhere, the vocabularies of politics and policy take a very different form (China, Japan). If social cohesion is no longer the policy approach of choice or it has been undermined by the events of the first decade of the 21st century, then the question is what will replace it, especially given that the settlement of immigrants and positive community relations between host and immigrant communities will remain a very important challenge for many states in this next decade of the century.

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